

**International  
Comparative  
Legal Guides**



Practical cross-border insights into corporate governance law

**Corporate Governance  
2022**

**15<sup>th</sup> Edition**

Contributing Editors:

**Adam O. Emmerich & Sabastian V. Niles**  
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

**ICLG.com**

## Expert Analysis Chapters

- 1** **2022 – The Expanding Spotlight on Boards of Directors**  
Sabastian V. Niles, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
- 4** **Dual-Class Share Structures in the United States**  
Keith Hallam & Daniel J. Cerqueira, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP

## Q&A Chapters

- 15** **Austria**  
Schoenherr: Roman Perner & Leon Scheicher
- 22** **Brazil**  
Trindade Sociedade de Advogados: Pedro Testa & Thiago Saddi Tannous
- 29** **China**  
Tian Yuan Law Firm: Raymond Shi (石磊)
- 40** **Finland**  
Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd: Klaus Ilmonen
- 49** **France**  
Lacourte Raquin Tatar: Guillaume Roche & Antoine Lassier
- 62** **Germany**  
POELLATH: Dr Eva Nase & Stefanie Jahn
- 69** **India**  
Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas: Cyril Shroff & Amita Gupta Katragadda
- 78** **Ireland**  
Arthur Cox: Brian O’Gorman & Michael Coyle
- 87** **Italy**  
Zunarelli – Studio Legale Associato: Luigi Zunarelli & Iolanda Cavallo
- 95** **Japan**  
Nishimura & Asahi: Nobuya Matsunami & Kaoru Tatsumi
- 103** **Luxembourg**  
GSK Stockmann: Dr Philipp Moessner & Anna Lindner
- 110** **Mexico**  
Creel Abogados, S.C.: Carlos Creel C. & Gustavo Struck Creel
- 117** **Netherlands**  
NautaDutilh: Stefan Wissing, Maarten Buma, Geert Raaijmakers & Frans Overkleeft
- 124** **Norway**  
BAHR: Svein Gerhard Simonnæs & Asle Aarbakke
- 129** **Puerto Rico**  
Ferraiuoli LLC: Fernando J. Rovira-Rullán & Andrés I. Ferriol-Alonso
- 136** **Slovenia**  
Law Firm Neffat: Domen Neffat & Jakob Stanič Gruden
- 143** **Spain**  
Uría Menéndez: Eduardo Geli & Soraya Hernández
- 155** **Sweden**  
Mannheimer Swartling Advokatbyrå: Patrik Marcellius, Cecilia Björkwall & Isabel Frick
- 162** **Switzerland**  
Advestra: Rashid Bahar & Annette Weber
- 170** **Turkey**  
Cektir Law: Berk Çektir & Uğur Karacabey
- 177** **United Kingdom**  
Hogan Lovells: Patrick Sarch & Danette Antao
- 187** **USA**  
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz: Sabastian V. Niles

# Luxembourg

GSK Stockmann



Dr Philipp Moessner



Anna Lindner

## 1 Setting the Scene – Sources and Overview

### 1.1 What are the main corporate entities to be discussed?

The most comprehensive legal framework concerning corporate governance applies to companies (“**Issuers**”) whose shares are listed and admitted to trading on a regulated market (“**Regulated Market**”) within the meaning of Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, as amended, such as the Official List of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. In Luxembourg, Issuers are most commonly organised as a public limited liability company (*société anonyme* – “**SA**”).

Less stringent corporate governance laws and practices apply to entities whose securities are listed and admitted to trading on the Euro MTF operated by the Luxembourg Stock Exchange as well as investment fund structures. Such entities are not covered by this chapter.

### 1.2 What are the main legislative, regulatory and other sources regulating corporate governance practices?

The Luxembourg law of 10 August 1915 on commercial companies, as amended (the “**Companies Law**”) is the main source of corporate governance-related legislation and is generally applicable to all commercial companies, including the SA. Disclosure obligations of commercial companies are further defined in the law of 19 December 2002 on the register of commerce and companies and the accounting and annual accounts of undertakings (the “**2002 Law**”).

Issuers are further subject to:

- the Luxembourg law of 24 May 2011 relating to the exercise of certain shareholder rights in general meetings of listed companies, as amended (the “**Shareholder Rights Law**”);
- the Luxembourg law dated 11 January 2008 on transparency requirements for issuers, as amended (the “**Transparency Law**”);
- the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (the “**Prospectus Regulation**”) and the Luxembourg law of 16 July 2019 on prospectuses for securities, as amended (the “**Prospectus Law**”); and
- the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (the “**MAR**”) and the Luxembourg law of 23 December 2016 on market abuse, as amended (the “**Market Abuse Law**”).

The CSSF, the Luxembourg supervisory authority in the financial sector, regularly publishes circulars, annual reports and FAQs on various corporate governance-related topics.

In relation to Issuers listed and/or admitted to trading on the Official List of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (“**Luxembourg Issuers**”) and companies listed on the Euro MTF, the Luxembourg Stock Exchange provides further guidelines in its X Principles of Corporate Governance (the “**X Principles**”) as well as its Rules and Regulations.

### 1.3 What are the current topical issues, developments, trends and challenges in corporate governance?

During the COVID-19 pandemic, virtual general meetings became the new standard. In the new post-pandemic environment, Issuers are facing the task of transitioning back into a non-emergency legal framework where physical general meetings, with all their challenges, are the norm.

In addition, ESG matters remain a key driver of Luxembourg’s corporate governance landscape with a particular focus on non-financial and corporate sustainability reporting. In 2022, the non-financial reporting requirements under the Taxonomy Regulation (EU) 2020/852 apply for the first time. The EU Commission’s proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, currently in the trilogue phase, will significantly extend the scope of sustainability reporting obligations imposed on Issuers and also apply to a large number of non-listed companies.

### 1.4 What are the current perspectives in this jurisdiction regarding the risks of short termism and the importance of promoting sustainable value creation over the long term?

Luxembourg has identified short-termism as an issue and promotes a sustainable value creation with a long-term perspective. The X Principles emphasise long-term value creation by requiring the board of directors, among others, to serve all shareholders by ensuring the long-term success of the Company (*Principle 2*), to establish a remuneration policy which is compatible with the long-term interests of the company (*Principle 7*), to set up strict rules in relation to the company’s risk management (*Principle 8*) and to define its corporate social responsibility (*Principle 9*).

In addition, Luxembourg transposed the Shareholder Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828 (“**SRD II**”) into national law in 2019. The main goal of SRD II is to reshape the corporate governance of Issuers toward sustainability, to encourage long-term shareholder engagement and to improve Issuer-shareholder dialogue. Since the introduction of SRD II, sustainable value creation has been the focus of various legislative efforts in the European Union, such as the Taxonomy Regulation (adopted), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (proposed in 2021) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (proposed in 2022).

## 2 Shareholders

### 2.1 What rights and powers do shareholders have in the strategic direction, operation or management of the corporate entity/entities in which they are invested?

In Luxembourg, the board of directors (one-tier structure) or management board (two-tier structure; *please refer to question 3.1 below for further explanation*) is responsible for the operation and management of a company and usually defines the company's strategic direction. However, the articles of association of the company may limit the powers of the board of directors or supervisory board/management board and reserve specific matters to the general meeting of shareholders. In addition, Luxembourg law grants the shareholders the following rights which ensure that they have a certain level of control with respect to the company's management and operation:

- The general meeting of shareholders appoints the members of the board of directors (one-tier structure) or the members of the supervisory board (two-tier structure; *please refer to question 3.1 below*) and may remove them from office at any time (*articles 441-2 and 442-14 Companies Law*).
- The general meeting of shareholders appoints the auditor(s) of the company (*article 69 2002 Law*).
- The general meeting of shareholders resolves annually on the granting of discharge to the board of directors (one-tier structure) or the supervisory board and management board (two-tier structure) on the basis of the company's annual accounts (*article 461-7 Companies Law*).
- Shareholders holding at least 10% of the votes at the general meeting having resolved on a discharge may bring a liability action against the directors or the members of the management board and the supervisory board on behalf of the company (*article 444-2 Companies Law*).
- The general meeting of shareholders decides on any changes to the corporate object, the articles of association (*article 450-3 Companies Law*), capital increases and reductions (*articles 420-22 and 450-5 Companies Law*), the redemption of shares (*article 430-15 Companies Law*), the exclusion of shareholders' preferential subscription rights and the creation of authorised share capital (*articles 420-26 (5) and 420-22 Companies Law*) and resolve on any mergers (*articles 1021-3 and 1022-1 Companies Law*), divisions (*article 1031-3 Companies Law*) as well as the liquidation of the company (*article 1100-2 Companies Law*).

Luxembourg law also grants some rights to minority shareholders (please refer to question 2.8).

### 2.2 What responsibilities, if any, do shareholders have with regard to the corporate governance of the corporate entity/entities in which they are invested?

In Luxembourg, the board of directors or supervisory board/management board is mainly responsible for the corporate governance of the company. Shareholders are not required to take any actions with respect to the corporate governance of the company. However, Luxembourg laws and practice encourage shareholders to exercise their shareholder rights in order to influence and improve the company's corporate governance and ensure the sustainability of the company.

### 2.3 What kinds of shareholder meetings are commonly held and what rights do shareholders have with regard to such meetings?

From a legal perspective, there are two different kinds of

meetings which are commonly held: (i) (ordinary) general meetings where no quorum is required and decisions are made on a simple majority basis (unless provided otherwise in the articles of association or specific provisions of the law); and (ii) extraordinary general meetings where special quorum and majority requirements apply and a Luxembourg notary must be present.

- Annual general meeting and (ordinary) general meetings: At least one annual general meeting shall be held on the date stated in the articles of association of the company, where applicable, and in any case no later than six months after the end of the company's financial year (*article 450-8 Companies Law*). The annual general meeting typically resolves on the annual accounts, the allocation of the results and distribution of a dividend, the discharge of the directors, the supervisory board and management board members and the auditor of the company. Further items can be added to the agenda. No minimum attendance is required for (ordinary) general meetings, and a simple majority is sufficient for a resolution to be validly taken.
- Extraordinary general meetings are required to amend the company's articles of association (e.g. in connection with an increase/decrease of the share capital, the creation of authorised capital, a change of the corporate object). At least half of the share capital must be represented at the meeting, and the resolutions are validly taken if at least two third of the represented capital votes in favour (*article 450-3 Companies Law*).

General meetings are convened by the board of directors or the supervisory board/management board. Shareholders holding 10% of the share capital of the company may request that a general meeting be convened (*article 450-8 Companies Law*).

Shareholders are granted different rights that can be exercised before or during any general meeting:

- Before the meeting, shareholders have the right to access information on the company and the relevant documents for the general meeting, such as the annual accounts or relevant reports. Shareholders representing 10% (or 5% concerning Issuers) of the share capital may request a postponement of the meeting, ask questions beforehand and add items to the agenda of the meeting.
- During the meeting, shareholders have the right to participate in the meeting and vote on the resolutions proportionally to their shareholding. An attendance list will be made. Votes can be expressed in person or by proxy. The articles of association of a company may provide the possibility to exercise voting rights by electronic means. Finally, shareholders may deliberate and ask questions during the general meeting.

### 2.4 Do shareholders owe any duties to the corporate entity/entities or to other shareholders in the corporate entity/entities and can shareholders be liable for acts or omissions of the corporate entity/entities? Are there any stewardship principles or laws regulating the conduct of shareholders with respect to the corporate entities in which they are invested?

In Luxembourg, shareholders generally do not owe any duties to the company's corporate governance. Shareholders are only liable up to the amount of their participation in the share capital. However, the founders of the company are jointly liable toward third parties for:

- all not validly subscribed parts of the capital as well as the difference between the minimum capital and the amount of subscriptions;
- the effective payment of up to 25% of the subscribed shares at the time of constitution of the subscribed shares;

- the payment within five years of the shares issued in consideration of contributions other than in cash; and
- in case of nullity of the company, or in case of and starting from the absence or non-conformity of the statements in the deed or in the company's object, the compensation for the prejudice resulting from them.

In addition, shareholders can be liable for the acts or omissions of the company if they appeared to have acted as *de facto* managers, i.e. even though not appointed as a director, the relevant shareholder has regularly and independently performed acts or duties normally performed by directors, or represented the company. However, this liability is not based on the shareholder, but applies to any person who *de facto* managed the company.

Luxembourg does not have any stewardship laws. However, institutional investors and asset managers are required on a comply-or-explain basis to develop and publicly disclose their engagement policy describing how they integrate shareholder engagement in their investment strategy and to disclose annually how their engagement policy has been implemented. Some shareholders of Luxembourg-based Issuers chose to follow best practices, such as the Principles of Responsible Investment.

### 2.5 Can shareholders seek enforcement action against the corporate entity/entities and/or members of the management body?

Shareholders may seek enforcement action against the board of directors or the supervisory board/management board on the basis of the following breaches:

- Mismanagement: the members of the board of directors or the supervisory board/management board are liable for the execution of their mandate and the faults committed during the execution of such mandate. Shareholders, by a decision taken in a general meeting, can seek enforcement actions against the board members in that respect.
- Responsibility in case of breach of the company law and/or articles of association of the company. This action can also be sought by a single shareholder, provided that such shareholder can prove a prejudice different to the prejudice of all other shareholders; and by a minority of shareholders representing at least 10% of the share capital of the company.
- Shareholders can seek civil enforcement actions against members of the board of directors or the supervisory board/management board in case of fault (*articles 1382 and 1383 Civil Code*). This action can also be sought by a single shareholder. However, the person(s) invoking these articles must have suffered personal damage.
- Finally, criminal offences may give rise to enforcement actions by the shareholders.

### 2.6 Are there any limitations on, or disclosures required, in relation to the interests in securities held by shareholders in the corporate entity/entities?

In Luxembourg, the articles of association of a company may contain certain limitations, e.g. in relation to the rights attached to the shares, the persons eligible to become shareholders and the amount of shares one person may hold.

In accordance with the law of 13 January 2019 creating a register of beneficial owners, all companies registered with the Luxembourg Trade and Companies Register shall disclose certain information concerning their beneficial owners. Issuers are only required to register the name of the Regulated Market.

In addition, shareholders of Issuers must notify the Issuer and the CSSF when their shareholding reaches, exceeds or falls

below the thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33.33%, 50% and 66.66% of the total shareholding of the company (*article 8 Transparency Law*).

Majority shareholders that hold, directly or indirectly, 95% of the share capital and of the voting rights of a company must notify, among others, such holding to the CSSF, in accordance with the law of 21 July 2012 on mandatory squeeze-out and sell-out ("**Squeeze-out Law**").

### 2.7 Are there any disclosures required with respect to the intentions, plans or proposals of shareholders with respect to the corporate entity/entities in which they are invested?

In Luxembourg, shareholders are generally not required to disclose their intentions, plans or proposals with respect to their shareholding. However, in connection with a takeover or merger, the bidder is required to disclose its intentions in relation to the target company with respect to certain matters, as set out in the law of 19 May 2006 transposing Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids (the "**Takeover Law**"). When the shareholding of one person alone or together with persons acting in concert reaches the threshold of 33.33% of the entity's voting rights, this person is required to make a mandatory takeover bid, addressed to all the holders of those securities. The decision to make a bid has to be made public by the offeror and the CSSF has to be informed of it.

Further, under the Squeeze-out Law, majority shareholders that hold, directly or indirectly, 95% of the share capital, can require all the holders of the remaining securities to sell their securities to them. The majority shareholders must notify their intention to do so to the CSSF and the company itself, before making the offer public. Under the Squeeze-out Law, the holders of the remaining securities may also require the majority shareholders to buy the remaining securities.

### 2.8 What is the role of shareholder activism in this jurisdiction and is shareholder activism regulated?

There is no specific regulation concerning shareholder activism. However, Luxembourg law provides certain minority rights to shareholders, notably:

- shareholders holding at least 5% of an Issuer's subscribed capital have the right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting and to table draft resolutions for items included or to be included on the agenda of the general meeting (*article 4 Shareholder Rights Law*);
- shareholders holding at least 10% of the votes at the general meeting having resolved on the discharge may bring a minority action against the directors, the members of the management board or the supervisory board on behalf of the Company (*article 444-2 Companies Law*);
- shareholders owning at least 10% of the share capital or voting rights are entitled to request information on management decisions with respect to operations of the company and its subsidiaries and may apply to have one or more experts appointed in case the management does not respond (*article 1400-3 Companies Law*); and
- shareholders representing at least one tenth of the capital have the right to request the convening of a general meeting (*article 450-8 Companies Law*) or the adjournment of any general meeting (*article 450-1 (6) Companies Law*).

The X Principles require Luxembourg Issuers to treat majority and minority shareholders equally (*Recommendation 10.2*).

### 3 Management Body and Management

#### 3.1 Who manages the corporate entity/entities and how?

The SA may be organised in a one-tier structure where the main management body is the board of directors or a two-tier structure where the management responsibilities are shared between the supervisory board and the management board. In a one-tier structure, the board of directors may also resolve to delegate almost all or parts of their management functions to a CEO, a management committee or a day-to-day manager, if so provided in the articles of association. The one-tier structure is the default structure if no choice is made.

One-tier structure: The board of directors comprises at least three members (*article 441-2 Companies Law*). According to the X Principles, the board of directors should have an appropriate size to facilitate effective decision-making and to provide the necessary expertise without undermining effective deliberations. Accordingly, the X Principles recommend a maximum of 16 board members (*Recommendation 3.3*).

At least two directors shall qualify as independent in accordance with the independence criteria set out in the X Principles. In addition, the board of directors shall form the following committees: audit committee; nomination committee; remuneration committee; and CSR committee.

Two-tier structure: The management board is vested with the widest management powers, unless matters are reserved by law or the articles of association to the supervisory board or the general meeting of shareholders. The management board comprises at least three members. This number may be reduced to one manager if the company's share capital is less than EUR 500,000 (*article 442-2 Companies Law*). The supervisory board shall monitor the actions of the management board and provide advice, but refrain from interfering or influencing the management. The supervisory board must be composed of at least three members.

In Luxembourg, directors may be individuals as well as legal entities.

#### 3.2 How are members of the management body appointed and removed?

One-tier structure: The initial directors are appointed in the constitutional documents of the SA. Following incorporation, directors are appointed and removed by decision of the general meeting of shareholders. The term of office of any director may not exceed six years, but directors may be re-appointed after the expiration of such term (unless the articles of association provide otherwise).

Two-tier structure: The members of the supervisory board are appointed and removed by decision of the general meeting of shareholders. The term of office of the members of the supervisory board may not exceed six years, but they may be re-appointed after the expiration of such term (unless the articles of association provide otherwise). Members of the management board are appointed and removed by the supervisory board, unless the articles of association provide otherwise.

In case of a vacancy concerning the board of directors or the management board, the remaining board members may appoint a replacement on a provisional basis, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. The general meeting of shareholders or, where applicable, the supervisory board will make the definitive appointment.

#### 3.3 What are the main legislative, regulatory and other sources impacting on compensation and remuneration of members of the management body?

Members of the board of directors and the management board/supervisory board may receive remuneration for their services. The remuneration of the board of directors or the supervisory board shall be determined by the general meeting. The remuneration of the members of the management board is determined by the supervisory board, unless the articles of association provide otherwise.

Under the Shareholder Rights Law, Issuers are obliged to publish a remuneration policy, which shall clearly explain how the remuneration of directors contributes to the business strategy, the long-term interests and the sustainability of the company (*article 7bis Shareholder Rights Law*). The remuneration policy shall be submitted to the vote of shareholders at least every four years. The vote is advisory, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. In case of a rejection by the general meeting, the company is required to propose a revised policy at the following general meeting.

In addition, the company must outline a clear and understandable report in relation to the remuneration granted to the company's directors in the past financial year (*article 7ter Shareholder Rights Law*). Such report shall be submitted to the advisory vote of the general meeting.

#### 3.4 What are the limitations on, and what disclosure is required in relation to, interests in securities held by members of the management body in the corporate entity/entities?

Members of the board of directors or supervisory board/management board (as well as any persons closely associated with them, such as family members) must notify the Issuer and the CSSF of any transaction made on their account in relation to the shares of the company (*article 19 MAR*).

The X Principles recommend that the board of directors of a Luxembourg Issuer defines rules in order to regulate transactions made by persons exercising management responsibilities (or by people closely related to them), on their own account, in relation to the shares of the company. The X Principles further require that a Luxembourg Issuer discloses its policy regarding transactions made by the board of directors in relation to the shares of the company in the corporate governance charter (*Recommendation 1.3, Appendix B*).

#### 3.5 What is the process for meetings of members of the management body?

The process concerning meetings of the board of directors and the supervisory board/management board is usually set out in the company's articles of association. Typically, a convening notice will be required in order to allow the board members to attend and prepare the meeting in advance. Convening formalities may usually be waived if all members agree to such waiver.

Attendance of meetings may be in person, by proxy or via video conference or other telecommunication means that ensure the identification and the participation of the member.

The board of directors of a Luxembourg Issuer shall ensure the preparation of minutes summing up the deliberations and noting any decisions taken by the board (*Recommendation 2.3*). Unless the articles of association provide otherwise, the board of directors or the management board and the supervisory board may adopt written resolutions unanimously.

### 3.6 What are the principal general legal duties and liabilities of members of the management body?

The main duties of directors (and other members of the management bodies) are the following:

- Duty of careful, diligent and wise management: the duty to manage the company with a level of diligence and prudence that may be expected from a person in that position. Directors must apply the necessary care and attention to their office. This is a best-effort obligation (*obligation de moyens*); therefore directors do not have to meet a specific result.
- Duty of loyalty: the duty to ensure that the interest of the company prevails over the personal interests of directors. In particular, directors shall avoid any conflict of interest. A conflict of interest arises where a director has a direct or indirect financial interest that is conflicting with that of the company (*articles 441-7 Companies Law*).
- Duty of skills and availability: the duty to accept a mandate only if the director has the necessary skills, qualities and time capacity.
- Duty of confidentiality: the duty to avoid the disclosure of any information with respect to the company that is confidential.

With respect to liabilities, directors, members of the management board and of the supervisory board may be held liable as follows:

- toward the company in the event that they committed a fault that damaged the company (*article 441-9 first paragraph Companies Law*);
- toward the company or third parties if their conduct was in breach of the applicable law and/or the articles of association (*article 441-9 second paragraph Companies Law*). In this case, shareholders may individually act against the directors or members of the management committee if they prove to have been independently prejudiced;
- in accordance with tort regulation (*articles 1382 and 1383 Civil Code*), if the requirements provided by the Companies Law are not fulfilled; and
- in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Code (*Code Pénal*) or the criminal provisions of the Companies Law.

### 3.7 What are the main specific corporate governance responsibilities/functions of members of the management body and what are perceived to be the key, current challenges for the management body?

The board of directors or the management board have the most extensive powers to pursue the object of the company, with the exception of those powers reserved by law or the articles of association to the general meeting or, where applicable, the supervisory board.

Given that the responsibilities and functions of members vary depending on the company's business model as well as the individuals and their expertise, the X Principles outline only a few specific functions, such as the creation of specific committees, which operate under the supervision and responsibility of the board of directors (*Recommendation 3.9*).

Following the direct impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the key challenge for management bodies remains navigating the increasingly complex sustainability regulations applicable to Issuers and aligning them to their investors' expectations.

### 3.8 Are indemnities, or insurance, permitted in relation to members of the management body and others?

It is possible to cover potential liabilities of directors and the members of the management board and supervisory board with an insurance policy. These policies are often concluded by the company, but the directors and/or officers may also conclude individual insurance policies in order to have a broader coverage. The insurance policies generally cover civil liabilities deriving from potential faults or negligence, but excluding gross negligence and/or wilful acts.

### 3.9 What is the role of the management body with respect to setting and changing the strategy of the corporate entity/entities?

The board of directors or supervisory board are the main organs responsible for defining the strategy of the company. The X Principle requires the board of directors of Luxembourg Issuers to specifically decide on the values and objectives of the company, its strategy and the key policies to be implemented, as well as the level of risk acceptable to the company (*Recommendation 2.3*). In order to promote long-termism, the X Principles further require Luxembourg Issuers to integrate CSR aspects in their business strategy (*Recommendation 9.1*).

## 4 Other Stakeholders

### 4.1 May the board/management body consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders in making decisions? Are there any mandated disclosures or required actions in this regard?

Luxembourg laws and practice encourage the board of directors/management board to consider the interests of shareholders as well as other stakeholders, such as bond holders, employees, and creditors and, increasingly so, even public interests (notably regarding climate change). In particular, the X Principles require the board of directors/management board of Luxembourg Issuers to consider corporate social responsibility aspects and to take into account the interests of all stakeholders in their deliberations.

The board of directors/management board is not required to disclose to shareholders if and to which extent interests of other stakeholders have been considered. However, there are certain disclosure obligations which entail that the board of directors/management board explains its decision-making process. Notably, the board of directors/management board of an Issuer shall disclose how the pay and employment conditions have been taken into account when establishing the company's remuneration policy in accordance with *article 7bis* of the Shareholder Rights Law.

The X Principles require a Luxembourg Issuer to define its corporate social responsibility policy and recommend on a comply-or-explain basis to present the corporate social responsibility information either in a dedicated report or in a specific section of its management report (*please refer to question 4.4 for further information*).

### 4.2 What, if any, is the role of employees in corporate governance?

In Luxembourg, Issuers are generally not required to appoint representatives of the company's employees into management or supervisory positions. Exceptions apply to companies with more than 1,000 employees over a period of three years, a qualifying public participation and/or a concession of the state.

Companies employing more than 15 employees are required to designate at least one employee delegate. The number of employee delegates as well as their participation and information rights concerning the company's employment policies increase gradually with the number of employees of the company.

#### 4.3 What, if any, is the role of other stakeholders in corporate governance?

The X Principles require the board of directors/management board of Luxembourg Issuers to consider the interests of all stakeholders in their deliberations (*Principle 2*). However, the X Principles do not further define the term "stakeholders".

In particular, the board of directors/management board shall consider the interests of employees in connection with a takeover (*articles 6 (2) and 10 (5) Takeover Law*), a cross-border merger (*articles 1021-1 (4) and 1021-5 Companies Law*) and the remuneration of directors (*articles 7bis (6) Shareholder Rights Law*).

#### 4.4 What, if any, is the law, regulation and practice concerning corporate social responsibility and similar ESG-related matters?

The X Principles require a Luxembourg Issuer to define its corporate social responsibility policy which shall include responsibilities related to social and environmental aspects (*Principle 9*). On a comply-or-explain basis, the CSR information shall be included in a dedicated report or in a specific section of the management report. In order to further encourage non-financial considerations, the Luxembourg Stock Exchange has published a dedicated guide on ESG reporting.

## 5 Transparency and Reporting

#### 5.1 Who is responsible for disclosure and transparency and what is the role of audits and auditors in these matters?

The board of directors or the supervisory board/management board are mainly responsible for disclosure and transparency obligations incumbent on the company. Annual and half-yearly financial reports that are made publicly available by the Issuer shall contain a responsibility statement of the individuals responsible within the Issuer.

Specific disclosure obligations such as the notification to the Issuer and the CSSF concerning the shareholding of certain percentages in accordance with article 8 Transparency Law are addressed to the shareholders (*please refer to question 2.6 above*).

The auditor is appointed by the general meeting of shareholders and shall review and report on the annual financial statements of the Issuer (*article 3 Transparency Law*). Half-yearly reports as well as corporate governance and CSR reports do not have to be audited.

#### 5.2 What corporate governance-related disclosures are required and are there some disclosures that should be published on websites?

Under the Transparency Law, Issuers must comply with specific disclosure requirements with respect to regulated information within the meaning of article 1 (10) of the Transparency Law which comprises both periodic information (e.g. annual financial reports and half-yearly financial reports) and ongoing information (e.g. changes in shareholding or certain corporate events). The X Principles require Luxembourg Issuers to disclose in their annual reports a Corporate Governance Statement which describes all major events concerning their corporate governance.

In addition, the X Principles require Luxembourg Issuers to publish a corporate governance charter which shall describe the main aspects of its corporate governance policy, notably the company's structure, the internal regulations for the board of directors, its committees, and the executive management, as well as other important points (e.g. concerning remuneration).

Finally, the Issuer shall disclose its directors' remuneration in a remuneration report and a remuneration policy (*articles 7bis, 7ter Shareholder Rights Law*). Such disclosures shall be made publicly available on the Issuer's website for a period of 10 years (reports) or for at least as long it is applicable (policies).

#### 5.3 What are the expectations in this jurisdiction regarding ESG- and sustainability-related reporting and transparency?

Issuers meeting certain thresholds in relation to their balance sheet and number of employees either on a statutory or group level are required to provide a (consolidated) non-financial statement (*article 1730-1 Companies Law, article 68bis (2) 2002 Law*). The non-financial statement shall contain information on the group's development, performance, position and impact of its activity relating at least to environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.

Under the Taxonomy Regulation, for the first time, and in relation to financial year 2021, large Issuers are required to disclose, among others, (i) the proportion of their turnover derived from products and services of taxonomy-aligned activities, and (ii) the proportion of their CapEx and OpEx related to assets or processes associated with taxonomy-aligned activities. These sustainability reporting obligations are expected to become more standardised in connection with the gradual entry into force of delegated acts under the Taxonomy Regulation. Furthermore, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, once adopted and transposed into national law, will significantly extend the scope of Issuers and non-listed companies falling under the above-mentioned reporting obligations and also increase the scope of such obligations.



**Dr Philipp Moessner** focuses on Capital Markets (listed companies), Banking & Finance, Corporate and Real Estate Transactions. He is admitted to the Bar in Germany (2006) and Luxembourg (2007), and holds an LL.M. from McGill University (Montreal) and a Ph.D. from the University of Tübingen (*summa cum laude*).

Philipp speaks English, French and German, and is a member of the International Bar Association (IBA), the American Bar Association (ABA) and the Canadian Bar Association (CBA).

**GSK Stockmann**

44, Avenue John F. Kennedy  
L-1855 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 27 18 02 40

Email: [philipp.moessner@gsk-lux.com](mailto:philipp.moessner@gsk-lux.com)

URL: [www.gsk-lux.com](http://www.gsk-lux.com)



**Anna Lindner** focuses on Capital Markets, Banking & Finance, Corporate, Restructuring and Sustainable Finance. She is admitted to the Bar in Germany (2015) and Luxembourg (2017) and holds qualifications from the Julius Maximilian University in Würzburg and Humboldt University in Berlin.

Anna undertook traineeships at two major international law firms in Berlin in the areas of insolvency administration and antitrust, and was employed at a major international law firm in Frankfurt am Main with a focus on corporate and finance litigation. She speaks English, French and German, and is a member of the Luxembourg Banking Law Lawyers Association (ALJB).

**GSK Stockmann**

44, Avenue John F. Kennedy  
L-1855 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 27 18 02 43

Email: [anna.lindner@gsk-lux.com](mailto:anna.lindner@gsk-lux.com)

URL: [www.gsk-lux.com](http://www.gsk-lux.com)

GSK Stockmann is a leading independent European corporate law firm with over 200 professionals across our offices in Germany and Luxembourg. GSK Stockmann is the law firm of choice for Real Estate and Financial Services. In addition, we have deep-rooted expertise in key sectors including Funds, Private Equity & Venture Capital, Tax, Capital Markets, Public, Mobility, Energy and Healthcare. For international transactions and projects, we work together with selected reputable law firms abroad. Our advice combines an economic focus with entrepreneurial foresight. That is what is behind: Your perspective.

In Luxembourg, GSK Stockmann is the trusted adviser of leading financial institutions, asset managers, private equity houses, insurance companies, corporates and FinTech companies, with both a local and international reach. Our lawyers advise domestic and international clients in relation

to Banking & Finance, Capital Markets, Mergers & Acquisitions, Corporate Law and Private Equity, Investment Funds, Real Estate, Regulatory and Insurance, as well as Tax.

[www.gsk-lux.com](http://www.gsk-lux.com)

**GSK**  
STOCKMANN

# ICLG.com

## Current titles in the ICLG series

Alternative Investment Funds  
Anti-Money Laundering  
Aviation Finance & Leasing  
Aviation Law  
Business Crime  
Cartels & Leniency  
Class & Group Actions  
Competition Litigation  
Construction & Engineering Law  
Consumer Protection  
Copyright  
Corporate Governance  
Corporate Immigration  
Corporate Investigations  
Corporate Tax  
Cybersecurity  
Data Protection  
Derivatives  
Designs  
Digital Business  
Digital Health  
Drug & Medical Device Litigation  
Employment & Labour Law  
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments  
Environment & Climate Change Law  
Environmental, Social & Governance Law  
Family Law  
Fintech  
Foreign Direct Investment Regimes  
Franchise  
Gambling  
Insurance & Reinsurance  
International Arbitration  
Investor-State Arbitration  
Lending & Secured Finance  
Litigation & Dispute Resolution  
Merger Control  
Mergers & Acquisitions  
Mining Law  
Oil & Gas Regulation  
Patents  
Pharmaceutical Advertising  
Private Client  
Private Equity  
Product Liability  
Project Finance  
Public Investment Funds  
Public Procurement  
Real Estate  
Renewable Energy  
Restructuring & Insolvency  
Sanctions  
Securitisation  
Shipping Law  
Technology Sourcing  
Telecoms, Media & Internet  
Trade Marks  
Vertical Agreements and Dominant Firms